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Too Many Foreign Policy Experts

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. ROBERT R. BARRY *

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 22, 1960

Mr. BARRY. Mr. Speaker, there appeared Friday in the *Herald Statesman* of Yonkers, N.Y., an excellent editorial which cuts through the confused babble of comment on the President's recent Far East tour and points up the general misinterpretation of the results.

The editorial comments that it has compelled the Communists once more to show that they have a frantic fear of the principle apostle of international peace, President Eisenhower, and will do everything possible to prevent him from visiting other nations. What greater proof could there be of his persuasive effect and the importance the Communists place on the President's tours? The Communists will use every means at their command to prevent more nations of the world from being exposed to the powerful pro-Westernizing effect of the Eisenhower charm.

More of this kind of clear thinking would be welcome instead of the recurrent talk of failure.

[From the Yonkers (N.Y.) *Herald Statesman*, June 17, 1960]

TOO MANY FOREIGN POLICY EXPERTS

If the American people have confused notions about our foreign policy, that confusion has been caused by a proliferation of experts who just are not experts at all.

The news that the Japanese Government had asked President Eisenhower to postpone, or cancel, his impending trip to Tokyo was only minutes old before the air was filled with wordy characterizations of the situation as evidence of the failure of American diplomacy.

Leading Members of the opposition in Congress suddenly decided that the President never should have planned to go to Japan—that, as one of them put it, "he should have known" his plan might be nullified by Communist and national-leftist riots in Tokyo.

All of this it seems to us, constitutes gross misunderstanding, a misrepresentation of the facts, and a very poor evaluation of what will be the probable effects of the Tokyo situation of free world opinion.

To be sure, the President and his advisers knew he might face hostile demonstrations in Japan. But they knew that, even if the 1952 incident were to be repeated, he would have a right to go. He would be truculently advised at Paris. But the President's course in response seems to us to have been perfectly plain in each case: he would go ahead. It was his right and necessary. And it was the Communists the responsibility of the eyes of all the world, for power and a reckless violent interference with peace and hope for peace in the world.

Who would have been responsible for decency and justice and the intent at Paris and the heightened respect of a free world courage and dignity the freedom of the United States, not the international machine-shop of the world?

When the

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the Communists to show their ineptness in violent hands in Tokyo?

Who has compelled them, once more, to show that they are actually the principle apostle of international peace? The man, of course, whose personal prestige and influence they only too obviously regard as a dire threat to the success of their schemes for world domination.

It would have been a "failure of American diplomacy" only if the President had been able to go to Tokyo as a man whose travels were of no disturbing concern to Moscow or Peking.

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